INTRODUCTION
Guantanamo is influentially taken to be the paradigm for our time of the state of exception and its attendant sovereign rule. 1 In this rendition, so to speak, Guantanamo is a place of pervasive sovereign control where people are comprehensively contained beyond the law. Yet it has been cogently shown that law flourishes in this very scene supposedly devoid of it. 2 This revisionist account of Guantanamo indicates at least that there is a question about the adequacy of the received version of the exception and its attendant sovereign rule. The abrupt answer offered here is that the exception to the law is itself of the law and that the exception's attendant sovereign rule is constituted by law. Such an answer is then related to the sovereign claim of democracy's empire. In the result, democracy and its law are found to be conducive to empire yet also and ultimately opposed to it. The empire of the United States provides a telling 'case'.
THE RECEIVED EXCEPTION
The inevitable starting point is Schmitt's pronunciamento: 'Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.' 3 There is a dual constitution involved here. The immediate one is the constitution of the sovereign. The consequential constitution is that of a distinct legal order. It is the sovereign who, in deciding when a state of exception exists and the normal legal order has to be suspended, also decides what is the normal legal order. 4 The normal order is one of a 'boring', repetitive application of preexistent rules. 5 'In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition'. 6 The exception is, then and of necessity, illimitable. It 'cannot be circumscribed factually or made to conform to a preformed law'. 7 Rather, it 'frees itself from all normative ties;' it 'departs…from the legal norm'. 8 That is one side of the story. The other has to do with the primacy of law and the sovereign's dependence on it. That side will be recounted shortly. Its intimations are, however, already present in Schmitt's account. The sovereign decision on the exception needs the norm to which it is exceptional. Hence for Schmitt the exception only suspends the legal order. This legal order remains in the wings ever awaiting its return. And return it must if there is to be a sustaining of the norm to which the exceptional can continue to be exceptional. But that is not all. Law invades the realm of the exception, and does so despite the surpassing determinative force which another hugely influential elevation of the surpassing exception and of its attendant sovereignty, an elevation that now becomes pointedly challenging for it incorporates within itself a contamination that for Schmitt seemed merely to derogate from the purity of the separation between the sovereign exception and the legal order.
Agamben's exception has the same components as Schmitt's but the composition of each is different. For Schmitt the decision on the exception 'frees itself from all normative ties'. 12 Agamben's exception likewise frees itself but not as an occasional suspending of an otherwise distinctly enduring legal order. Rather, the exception now continuously enters into and comprehensively subordinates the legal order:
Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment.
The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that -while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally -nevertheless still claims to be applying the law.
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The exception 'everywhere becomes the rule' says Agamben, 14 and whereas for Schmitt the exception brings with it 'the power of real life [which] breaks through the crust' of the legal order, for Agamben the exception itself becomes a power ruling pervasively over life. into existence in the opening sentence of a work on 'political theology', the gist of which Schmitt explains in this way:
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development -in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver -but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts. In its responsiveness to the infinity of possible relation in our being together, law has to be ever changeful and, in some ultimate sense, a vacuity. As such, it cannot in itself, in any formed self, enduringly unite its determinate and receptive dimensions.
That same vacuity, however, renders law intimately receptive to power. And it is in the formation of the 'modern' national polity that we find a power endowing law, a power concentrated in the persistence of a pre-modern conception of sovereignty.
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Taking matters that far would help explain the subjection of law to the sovereign 26 This is not to deny that the position apart may provide an opening typically more wide in some legal situations than in others. The situation most frequently instancing the exception, a declaration of emergency, is but an example at the wider end. Congeries of 'exceptional' laws can now serve the same function as that performed by the supposed exception to the law (see Hussain, op. cit., n. 2). Standard lamentations, such as Schmitt's, about the spread of discretion and our being moved 'further and further from the ground or juridical certainty' (as quoted in Agamben, op. cit., n. 14, p. 172) manage to ignore the intrinsic ability of law to become other to itself. Even the most seemingly stable law carries with it a power of being radically revised or reversed. 27 J-L. Nancy a simple correspondence between democracy and law. Rather, there is an integral tie in which law creates, and continuously generates, democracy. The necessity for law specifically to do this can be derived from a seeming contradiction in democracy itself.
Democracy is rule by the people, but the people in itself cannot rule. This is the gist of Plato's complaint about democracy in Republic. 32 He, or his dramatis personae, concentrate on the quality of the democratic individual, but they do so in order to derive the quality of a 'corresponding…democratic political system'. 33 Such an individual 'indulges in every passing desire that each day brings', submits to 'every passing pleasure as its turn comes to hold office, as it were'; and, in all, 'his lifestyle has no rhyme or reason'. 34 The corresponding political system is promiscuously 'open' and potentially 'adorned with every species of human trait'. 35 It is, in short, this illimitable openness that is the prime and impelling constituent of democracy. Putting this in terms relevant to modern democracy, for Lefort democracy 'inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be said to be sovereign, of course, but whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain latent'. 36 Hence Lefort's thesis that the place of power in democracy is an 'empty place'; and the empty throne becomes the 'normal' condition. 37 It is not, however, a condition that simply and somehow results from naturalistic traits that Plato, for example, would attribute to it -a crucial point that will now be taken up.
The immediate problem is how the people, the demos of democracy, can assume any determinate existence at all, let alone a position of sovereignty. Democracy's premodern forms could resort to a defining force of the natural or of the supernatural to selectively constitute the people. With modernity, and as Lindahl incisively notes, 'the people' is incapable of coming together to constitute itself as a political unity and from there institute a political and legal order; rather, they come to be a people through the creation of that order. 38 So, this very people, in a feat of what Derrida would call 'fabulous retroactivity', 39 is a creation of what it is taken in standard perspectives as creating, a creature of the constitution and of laws made pursuant to it -electoral laws, laws to do with citizenship and immigration, laws to do with mental capacity, and so on. What is more, law produces the definitive processes of democratic, and of sovereign democratic, assertion. Such production extends to the vacuity, the empty place of democracy. In constituting democracy and its definitive processes, this production does so in a way that gives force and effect to this empty place. Law, that is, integrates into democracy's form and processes the ability to be other than what it may determinately be at any one time. With modern democracy, in short, power is purposively constituted or constructed as empty. 40 More specifically, this is achieved through law's sharing in and making operative …a discourse which reveals that power belongs to no one; that those who exercise power do not possess it; that they do not, indeed, embody it; that the exercise of power requires a periodic and repeated contest; that the authority of those vested with power is created and re-created as a result of the manifestation of the will of the people. of the United States was to expand hugely, but it was republican in that the 'territories' so acquired had eventually to be admitted to the union as new states. is justified by the mantric insistence that, in the result, others will be brought within the fold of democracy and the rule of law. 43 The grand solipsism of empire radically qualifies this easy correspondence with democracy and law. Modern imperialism has been and remains based on national sovereignty, a sovereignty bound in terms that are elevated exemplarily. So, Jefferson's model, which was to be 'an empire of liberty', became racially qualified in its application leaving some indefinitely outside the range of achievable civilization. 44 Leaping over to the current scene, we find an imperium officially asserted in terms that are naturalist and divisive, yet transcendent. did not simply involve the embroiled question of whether the invasion of Iraq was 'legal'. The breach of international law does not necessarily or usually entail the assertion that, as here, one is superior to it, and superior to the institutions of the international community that create it. The quality of a breach could, however, be quite telling in this respect. Violation of standards, of human rights for example, that are taken to be definitive of the international community, or violation that would seek to undermine the hold of law and its processes, could evidence a hostility or disregard that affirmed superiority at least implicitly. That much could also be extracted from not only the refusal to enter into treaties of a like quality but also from the assiduous undermining of them. And activities of these kinds have been plentiful in the recent history of American empire. 48 
